Last updated on May 15, 2026
Nonprofit seeks protection for “know your rights” trainings as federal agents prepare to fan out across southeast Louisiana
A federal judge in New Orleans heard arguments Thursday on whether Louisiana’s new immigration obstruction law can be applied to “know your rights” trainings, but did not immediately block the statute as a major federal enforcement sweep moved into the city.
U.S. District Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown presided over a morning hearing on a request from Immigration Services and Legal Advocacy and the ACLU of Louisiana for a temporary restraining order that would bar officials from using Act 399 against ISLA’s public education work.
Judge Brown did not decide whether to grant the TRO. She noted a key concession by the state that may indicate a lessening of any threat to freedom of expression. “There’s an understanding and agreement as to how this statute will be applied and that it will not be applied to violate your client’s constitutional rights,” she told plaintiffs’ counsel, according to a report published by the Louisiana Illuminator.
The case, Immigration Services and Legal Advocacy v. Murrill, arises at the point where a Trump administration immigration enforcement campaign meets a new state obstruction law that reaches civil immigration proceedings. The dispute raises legal questions about how far states may go in criminalizing “any act” that interferes with federal raids and about how federal courts apply First Amendment and due process principles when legal aid groups say they have stopped speaking because of the threat of those laws.
ISLA’s complaint describes the nonprofit as a legal services organization that “defends the rights of immigrant communities and advocates for just and humane immigration policy,” including free representation of people in immigration detention. It alleges that the case is “about the State of Louisiana’s unlawful attempts to use the threat of vague and overbroad felony charges to silence the residents of New Orleans, Louisiana, from speaking out about the rights of immigrants during the federal operation dubbed ‘Catahoula Crunch’ or ‘Operation Swamp Sweep.’”
Lousiana’s Act 399 of 2025, the law at issue, revises the definition of obstruction in state statute so that it now applies not only to criminal proceedings, but also to “a civil immigration proceeding, or official act of an agent or employee of a governmental entity.” It also adds a new example of obstruction: “Knowingly committing any act intended to hinder, delay, prevent, or otherwise interfere with or thwart federal immigration enforcement efforts.” When obstruction involves a civil immigration proceeding, the law authorizes fines of up to $5,000 and imprisonment of up to one year. A separate section amends Louisiana’s malfeasance statute to make it a crime for public officials to refuse certain immigration detainers or to release someone from custody without notifying federal immigration authorities, if they act “with the intent to hinder, delay, prevent, or otherwise interfere, ignore, or thwart federal immigration enforcement efforts.”
The complaint and local coverage note that Act 399 does not define which “acts” count as interference. The report published by the Illuminator summarized the statute as purporting to criminalize “any act” that could “hinder, delay, prevent, or otherwise interfere with or thwart federal immigration enforcement efforts,” and reported concerns from advocates that the language could reach protests and education efforts as well as physical obstruction.
The case unfolds during Operation Catahoula Crunch in New Orleans, which the Department of Homeland Security describes as targeting “criminal illegal aliens” who were released from local jails. Planning documents obtained by the Associated Press indicate that the operation is intended to cover southeast Louisiana and reach into Mississippi, with a target of thousands of arrests. Verite News reported Wednesday that hundreds of Border Patrol agents would be deployed in the New Orleans region as part of the sweep.
Know-your-rights sessions are a central part of ISLA’s work in that environment. According to the complaint, ISLA and other groups use them to explain constitutional protections such as the right to remain silent, the right to demand a warrant at the door, and the right to record public activity when immigration officers appear at homes or workplaces. “It is critical to empower immigrant communities and their allies to stand up against unlawful activity that may form part of Operation Swamp Sweep,” the complaint states. ISLA alleges that Act 399 and public statements by Pelican State attorney general Liz Murrill have led it to “make a concerted decision to stop providing KYRs to the community.”
A temporary restraining order is a short-term remedy that federal courts use in emergencies. TROs preserve the status quo for days or weeks while a dispute is briefed and, sometimes, while a preliminary injunction motion is prepared. In its TRO motion, ISLA argues that the threat of criminal prosecution has caused it to self-censor, and that loss of First Amendment activity is a form of irreparable injury. The motion also asserts that Act 399 is overbroad and vague because phrases such as “any act,” “interfere with,” and “thwart federal immigration enforcement efforts” do not give ordinary people clear notice of what is prohibited.
The complaint contends that Act 399 “appears, at face value, to criminalize the provision of KYR information” and that its terms “appear to proscribe KYRs” for immigrants and their allies. It alleges that the statute is both overbroad, because it sweeps in protected advocacy along with conduct that obstructs enforcement, and vague, because it leaves “unfettered discretion” to officials to decide what counts as interference in the context of immigration raids. ISLA argues that those features invite selective enforcement based on the content and purpose of speech.
The state’s opposition brief describes Act 399 differently. Lawyers for Murrill and the Louisiana State Police write that the statute, “particularly in the obstruction context,” is “directed towards conduct, not speech,” and that it was intended for “violent scenes where defendants have physically inhibited a law-enforcement officer from carrying out his duties.” They argue that ISLA “cites no instance of Act 399 being enforced to prohibit such pure First Amendment-protected speech,” and state that the Attorney General and State Police “would [not] enforce Act 399 in that manner.”
In that filing, the state takes the position that ISLA’s planned KYR presentations do not fall within the statute at all. “There is nothing to enjoin or restrain because Plaintiff does not seek to engage in conduct that is actually covered by Act 399,” the brief says, arguing that ISLA lacks standing and that its chilling-effect claims are the result of its own interpretation of the law rather than a credible threat of enforcement. After the hearing, a spokesperson for Murrill directed reporters to her post on X, where she wrote that the ACLU “filed a lawsuit over nothing – there is no First Amendment problem with Act 399” and pointed to the court’s decision not to issue a TRO that day.
Outside the courthouse, plaintiffs’ counsel emphasized the significance of the state’s written assurances. Nora Ahmed, legal director of the ACLU of Louisiana, told Verite that the opposition brief itself “is a win” because it describes how the state understands the scope of Act 399. Ahmed said that Murrill and State Police Superintendent Robert Hodges had “agreed that the law would not be used to prosecute ISLA in any way as it relates to their trainings and presentations,” and that they described Act 399 as being “ultimately, apparently conceived for addressing violent conduct.”
At the same time, the complaint and TRO motion point out that the state’s description of the law is not written into the statute, and that future officials or prosecutors might interpret the “any act” language differently. The filings argue that a formal ruling on the constitutional questions would provide greater clarity for legal-aid groups, local officials, and protesters who may face similar situations during future immigration operations.
Brown’s eventual decision on the temporary restraining order will determine whether Act 399 remains fully enforceable during the Trump regime’s immigration crackdown in Louisiana or whether the state must refrain from applying its new statutory obstruction and malfeasance provisions while the broader legal challenges proceed.
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