In a future training exercise envisioned by Pentagon planners, palm-sized drones dart through a simulated conflict zone, feeding real-time intelligence to mobile ground units. Nearby, cyber teams work to intercept enemy signals and deny GPS access. These imagined battle conditions reflect a changing military reality. And it is one the U.S. Army says it can no longer afford to ignore.
On May 1, the Army’s leaders, Secretary Daniel P. Driscoll and Chief of Staff Gen. Randy A. George, issued a sweeping “Letter to the Force” announcing a fundamental shift to meet the demands of what senior leaders call a rapidly evolving global security environment. The reforms, shaped by both doctrinal reflection and operational urgency, include force reductions, the divestment of legacy systems, and the creation of new multi-domain formations. They come on the heels of an April 30 directive from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth ordering the Army to transform into a leaner, more lethal force.
“To maintain our edge on the battlefield, our Army will transform to a leaner, more lethal force by adapting how we fight, train, organize, and buy equipment,” Driscoll and George wrote.
According to the 2022 National Defense Strategy, developed under former President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and the Army’s 2021 Modernization Strategy, the nation’s lead ground warfare force must turn away, according to Amos C. Fox, a retired officer affiliated with Arizona State University’s Future Security Initiative, “from a land warfare centric force, composed of self-sufficient brigades and divisions, to a force geared to protect and support the joint force and coalition partners with an emphasis on artillery and drones.”
The Army’s 2021 Modernization Strategy “identifies six materiel modernization priorities to develop the warfighting capabilities needed in a major conflict with a potential near-peer adversary,” according to a July 2024 report from the Government Accounting Office. “The priorities consist of various efforts to develop technologically advanced new equipment and upgrades to existing systems. The strategy also identifies force structure changes, such as developing new types of units, so that the Army can operate in air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace at the same time by 2035.”
Pressure to adopt the reforms comes from multiple directions that share in common a harbinger of rising global threats. China’s advancements in hypersonic missiles, space-denial systems, and autonomous weapons are reshaping regional balances. Meanwhile, Russia’s artillery-heavy campaign in Ukraine, reliant on drones, electronic warfare, and disinformation, has shown how traditional forces can be overwhelmed by modern ISR and precision fires. And there is also the possibility that technology the Army has long considered key to its battlefield edge may no longer be exclusively in U.S. hands. “In Iraq and Ukraine, U.S. adversaries have taken possession of the Army’s M1 Abrams tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle,” Fox wrote in a Nov. 2024 update on the service’s modernization program.
U.S. planners under Biden recognized that future conflicts will be fought in complex environments in which new technologies, too, as well as efforts by American rivals to threaten the U.S. itself and destabilize international relationships.
“Competitor strategies seek to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in the American way of war, including by creating anti-access, area-denial environments; developing conventional capabilities to undertake rapid interventions; posing all-domain threats to the U.S. homeland in an effort to jeopardize the U.S. military’s ability to project power and counter regional aggression; and using the cyber and space domains to gain operational, logistical, and information advantages,” proclaimed the 2022 NDS.
The Trump administration appears to have continued a commitment to addressing these perceived challenges. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth wrote in an April 30 memorandum to Pentagon leadership that the Army “must prioritize defending our homeland and deterring China in the IndoPacific region.”
“To build a leaner, more lethal force, the Army must transform at an accelerated pace by divesting outdated, redundant, and inefficient programs, as well as restructuring headquarters and acquisition systems,” Hegseth ordered. “Simultaneously, the Army must prioritize investments in accordance with the Administration’s strategy, ensuring existing resources are prioritized to improve long-range precision fires, air and missile defense . . ., cyber, electronic warfare, and counter-space capabilities.”
To meet the moment, the Army will phase out approximately 24,000 legacy positions by FY 2027 and create 7,500 billets in high-demand roles including cyber warfare, integrated fires, hypersonics, and AI-enabled battle management. Cold War-era systems such as the M113 armored personnel carrier and TOW missile will be retired, to be replaced by faster, networked, survivable platforms. Modular brigades and Multi-Domain Task Forces will, if all goes according to plan, serve as the organizational core of a 21st-century land force built to operate in contested domains. And the Army will integrate artificial intelligence into its operations. “Command and control nodes will integrate Artificial Intelligence to accelerate decision-making and preserve the initiative,” said Driscoll and George.
Hegseth “tasked the Army to field Unmanned Systems and Ground/Air launched effects in every division by the end of 2026; and to improve counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems mobility and affordability, integrating capabilities into maneuver platoons by 2026, and maneuver companies by 2027,” said a May 1 Army News Service report. “The Secretary wants the Army to enable AI-driven command and control at theater, corps, and division headquarters by 2027. The Army needs to extend advanced manufacturing, including 3D printing and additive manufacturing, to operational units by 2026.”
At the institutional level, Hegseth ordered the unification of Army’s Futures Command and Training and Doctrine Command, the merger of Forces Command, U.S. Army North, and U.S. Army South, and a change in the way the service manages materiel acquisition. The Army, Hegseth commanded, must “[r]estructure the sustainment enterprise by consolidating and realigning headquarters and units within Army Materiel Command, including the integration of the Joint Munitions Command and Army Sustainment Command, to optimize operational efficiency and streamline support capabilities.”
The material-related merger is expected to streamline the purchasing process and save taxpayer money. “The Army will reform contracting processes to improve efficiency such as implementing performance-based contracting to reduce waste and expand multi-year procurement agreements when cost-effective,” according to the ANS report.
This transformation marks a departure from an earlier modernization initiative called “Army After Next,” initiated during the 1990s, because it explicitly prioritizes strategic deterrence and large-scale combat operations across multiple domains. The earlier plan emphasized modularity and counterinsurgency.
That shift in focus has already resulted in high-profile program cuts. According to reporting by Stars & Stripes, the Army recently canceled the M10 Booker. A light armored combat vehicle introduced just two years ago, the Army cited its limited deployability and lack of fit with future operating concepts in the decision to drop it from the service inventory. Lt. Col. Jeff Tolbert, an Army spokesperson, added that the Booker program’s cancellation would allow for reinvestment into “war-winning capabilities” more aligned with the Army’s new force design.
Outside analysts support the shift. A recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes that modern conflict is defined by autonomous ISR, decentralized command, and contested spectrum dominance. “Massed fires and maneuver must now contend with autonomous sensors, drone-delivered munitions, and degraded communications environments,” the report concluded. A separate CSIS analysis emphasized the enduring importance of U.S. ground forces in Europe to deter Russian aggression and called for modular units capable of rapid deployment and survivability in anti-access environments.
The reorganization begins in summer 2025 with consolidation of command structures. FY 2026 will see rollout of new MDTFs and modular brigades, alongside accelerated divestment of Cold War systems. Full integration of the Army 2030 design is expected by FY 2028, contingent on congressional approval of appropriations and successful scaling of new training pipelines and acquisition frameworks.
Whether this transformation will meet its strategic goals remains uncertain. Advocates argue it is both necessary and overdue. Critics may question whether the Army can overcome institutional inertia, recruit for complex high-tech roles, and sustain public support. The Army’s leadership, at least, appears to regard the undertaking as an essential one.
“Our Army must transform now to a leaner, more lethal force by infusing technology, cutting obsolete systems, and reducing overhead to defeat any adversary on an ever-changing battlefield,” Driscoll and George wrote in their May 1 letter. “Our continuous transformation is underpinned by strong, agile leaders who act on their initiative.”
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